

# Timeline: Observers Notes

## Phase 1

Phase 1 timeline events are documented in the following letters: Observations for the first half of the partisan review, before it was paused on May 14, are documented in the letters below. The Secretary of State's Office made several attempts to reach out to Senate President Karen Fann and Senate Liaison Ken Bennett to address the concerns that were raised by the office's observers. The list below also includes a letter from the Department of Justice, also addressed to Senator Fann, notifying her of issues of "potential non-compliance with federal laws enforced by the Department."<sup>110</sup>

**March 3, 2021**—The Secretary of State's Office sent Senate President Karen Fann a letter addressing "audit" concerns.

**April 1, 2021**—This Secretary of State's Office sent the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors a letter after the Senate's "audit" announcement.

**May 5, 2021**—This Secretary of State's Office sent a letter to Senate Liaison Bennett regarding ongoing concerns with the "audit."

**May 5, 2021**—The Department of Justice sent a letter to Senate President Fann, notifying her of issues of "potential non-compliance with federal laws enforced by the Department."

**May 11, 2021**—Attorneys representing the Secretary of State's Office sent a letter to the Senate's attorneys, addressing violations of the settlement agreement.

**May 13, 2021**—The Senate's attorneys sent a response to the May 11, 2021 letter from the Secretary of State's Office, which addressed violations of the settlement agreement. The May 13 letter from the Senate's attorneys failed to address those violations.

**May 17, 2021**—Attorneys representing the Secretary of State's Office raised ongoing issues with the audit.

**May 20, 2021**—The Secretary of State's Office notified the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors about the future use of election equipment.

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<sup>110</sup> See Appendix D.

April 29, 2021

- Observers noted multiple discussions regarding problems and confusion about how to tally overvotes, even among some of the best counting teams, because procedures had changed at least three times since the process began. It seemed that teams were following procedures that had been in place previously but had been replaced.

April 30, 2021

- Observers heard a Wake TSI paper examination technician say that the poor ballot images being captured were a result of the stadium lighting. The lighting had been an ongoing issue and was the reason that technicians had to reconfigure tables and continuously refocus the cameras.

May 4, 2021

- Observers requested information about the processes that were in place for identifying data entry errors, because there was no second person reviewing the data as it was being entered. Cyber Ninjas attorney Bryan Blehm responded that the quality control process would be implemented soon, inferring that there were no such processes in place at that time.

May 7, 2021

- Observers reported that only the table managers or runners could retrieve boxes of ballots from the cages or return them to the cages, but at some point, additional personnel were handling the ballot boxes. This security measure was disregarded and anyone was allowed to check boxes in or out of the cages.

May 8, 2021

- Observers were shown as items were captured by the microscope cameras. The images included:
  - Calibration mark in upper right (circle with +)
  - Timing mark at the top right (black square)
  - Bottom left area of blank paper—to see ‘fibers’ and ‘security feature’ of the paper
  - Vote selection for President (filled-in oval) – except when overvoted or undervoted. For an overvote, they choose a selection, since the intent was to determine whether the oval was filled with “ink or toner”
- Observers heard a paper examination manager say that “a lot has changed with the new user interface” for the software update.

May 10, 2021

- Observers witnessed the Red Module 12 counting station rip filled-out tally sheets in half and throw them on the table. All written sheets were to be maintained throughout the process.
- Observers were told by Gene Kern from Wake TSI not to wear a mask that had the word "VOTE" printed on it because it was political in nature and equated it to wearing a "Trump" or "MAGA" mask. In reality, this restriction is limited to political clothing that includes express advocacy of a candidate or ballot measure within areas of voting locations. When observers explained this, they were told "this isn't an election" and some participants were upset, so it should be removed.

May 11, 2021

- Observers spoke with Blehm and Kern about the quality control procedures, and were told that "if it hasn't started yet, it will start soon." Observers noted that it appeared that Blehm and Kern were unaware that quality control processes had not started. At that time, there were already approximately 275,000 votes entered, which equates to about 3,000 tally sheets entered into the spreadsheets. When the observers mentioned this, neither Bryan nor Gene responded. Blehm described the quality control process to observers as follows:
  - Quality control personnel will have "Read Only" access to the spreadsheets that were previously entered, along with the hard copy of the tally sheets.
  - They would compare the tally sheet to the spreadsheet.
  - If data was mismatched, they would "flag" the spreadsheet and send it back to the data entry staff.
  - The process would start over.

These processes were never implemented.

- Kern told observers that a single person was working on data aggregation, and was not available that day to demonstrate the aggregation process. She was not available throughout the completion of Phase 1, and Wake TSI did not participate in Phase 2. The observers assumed that since Jeannette was a single point of failure, when she did not return, the entire aggregation process had to be redeveloped.

May 12, 2021,

- Kern, Blehm, and David P. informed observers that the spreadsheets with the ballot tallies were being stored locally, directly on the computer, and that the computers are backed up to the server once a day. As part of the backup process, the server creates a hash of the file for an integrity check. However, no

logs are created on the files, except the general log of which Windows login account accessed the file, along with a date stamp.

- Observers noticed damaged ballots circulating at the counting stations. These ballots are typically duplicated so that they can run through a tabulator. The duplicated ballots are the ones that are counted, the damaged ballots are not (but they are retained. Observed noted concerns that the damaged ballots and the duplicated ballots were being counted, effectively double-counting those votes.
- A group of staff began scanning tally control sheets and tally sheets onto a thumb drive. Prior to this, the tally sheets were only kept in a hard copy format.

May 13, 2021

- Contractors began loading equipment into a trailer. They would need to pause operations temporarily because the Coliseum was being used for several high school graduation ceremonies. Observers watched the loading process and noted that there were four physical hard drives that the contractors said held images of the data extracted from the County's voting equipment.
- Observers reported that data entry computers were now networked to the server and that spreadsheets were no longer being saved locally to the computer terminal.
- Observers noted all computers were to be networked, including those at the physical Examination, Aggregation, and Pod Manager stations. They noticed that two pod manager stations and two new computers were still not connected to the server and that tally sheet scanning stations were left off the server. Observers were told that the computers would be added to the network when the contractors returned from the hiatus.
- Observers again saw damaged ballots circulating at the counting stations. The contractors assured observers that the data would not be double-counted, and instead would be tracked separately. However, observers saw a participant include the damaged ballot tally in with the data to be aggregated. Furthermore, observers noted that the file being used could be edited by another person and saved on the server, posing a data integrity issue.
- Observers noticed two StraTech employees plugging two 4-terabyte hard drives into each server. Observers were told that this was being done in order to make a final backup of the servers before they were moved for storage during the hiatus.

May 14, 2021

- Kern informed observers that the contractors had accidentally turned off the power to servers the night before, disrupting the backup process. Instead, Wake TSI would move the servers into a warehouse, set them up, and run the backups. Kern asserted that this course of action had always been the plan, contradicting the information that observers had received the day before.

## Phase 2:

May 24, 2021

- The external security gate was left unattended and partially open, allowing observers to walk in. It was later noted that the check-in process had changed, but observers had not been notified of this.
- Bennett confirmed that copies of voting system data had been sent to a lab in Montana. He did not specify what security measures were in place, what the lab in Montana would do with the data, or for how long the lab would be in possession of the copies.
- For several days, beginning on May 24, 2021, observers noted that a copy of a Wake TSI procedure manual, marked "confidential," had been left out and was sometimes unattended at the check-in counter.
- Bennett brought a cell phone onto the counting floor. Previously, cell phones had not been permitted on the floor as a security measure.
- When the contractors returned to the Coliseum, observers noted that new halogen light sources (AmScope HL-150) had been brought in, but the other paper examination stations had battery-powered headlamps shining light at the ballot.
- Observers noted new people and processes in place at the check-in point added to general confusion. Bennett was unable to identify the new person or entity leading the process, contributing to general confusion.

May 25, 2021

- A black pen was brought onto the counting floor. Pens with black and blue ink, which can be read by tabulators, are prohibited from being near ballots to ensure that these pens cannot be used to alter the ballots.
- Observers heard a paper examination manager state that the new people were taking low-quality images, or not capturing full images of the ballot. Contractors told the observers that using a microscope takes a specific skill set and not everyone can do it properly, contradicting a previous statement, which was that new people could be added to the stations because they needed extra people.
- During paper examination training, observers heard a manager direct personnel to focus on the corner cut marks and on whether or not the ballot was printed in color (i.e., commercially) or in black and white (i.e., ballot on demand). This was a new set of instructions that the observers had not heard previously. The paper

examination manager said that the other focal area should be the calibration mark alignment. As described, this was due to the fact that the front-to-back calibration marks can “predict the printer that the ballot was printed on.” The manager further substantiated that each printer distinctly prints each ballot with the same calibration, making the calibration configuration a unique identifier, “like a fingerprint.”

- The observers were informed that in order to set up more paper examination stations, the Senate contractors needed to “sacrifice the fourth camera.”

May 26, 2021

- Observers confirmed that quality control practices to ensure that data was entered correctly were still not in place, rendering all of the data and findings unreliable.
- Observers noted the paper examination stations had only two people working, instead of three or four, as before.
- Observers noticed that a new spreadsheet had been developed for the staff that was keying-in tally data.
- During a training session, observers overheard a paper examination manager say that the security feature that they were flagging was the “yellow speckles” in the corner of the ballot. Contractors said that these yellow speckles were a security feature that the paper manufacturer embeds in the paper to determine its authenticity. Earlier in the process, Cyber Ninjas described the security feature as a “watermark.” Election officials made it clear that there are no watermarks on ballots, and the contractors began referring to it as yellow speckles instead. Inkjet printers spray speckles of all colors to prevent them from gumming up or drying out. Additionally, the paper manager described that the calibration mark alignment identifies which ballot on demand printer the ballot came from, doubling down on the “fingerprint.”
- Contractors instructed participants to “flag more [ballots], err on the side of anomaly,” which resulted in many ballots erroneously being identified as “suspicious.”
- Pullen told an observer that the shirt he was required to wear on the floor made him “look like a transgender” because of the color of his shirt.

May 27, 2021

- Observers noted that State Senator Wendy Rogers was on the counting floor and was provided by Cyber Ninjas with a black pen with which to take notes. Pens with black and blue ink, which can be read by tabulators, are prohibited from being near ballots to ensure they cannot be used to alter the ballots. She also was writing on the white note paper that was provided to her and carried her cell phone in her back pocket, both violations of Cyber Ninjas’ own security measures.

- Bennett acknowledged that he was concerned with the lack of quality control. He told the observers that the traceability of the data from tally sheets to data entry and then to aggregation does not provide enough quality control and validation. When speaking with the observers, who informed him that the only quality checks were the new spreadsheet with formulas, Bennett said that “there should be a way to ensure the numbers were not transposed.”
- Observers heard a paper examination manager say that the weight of the microscope cameras was making them slide down and not stay in focus. It was also stated that the paper examination station personnel were not catching this error, so the photos being taken were out of focus.

May 28, 2021

- Observers witnessed a single counter and the table manager at Green Module 4 spinning and tallying ballots. The other two counters and the loader were on break. The observer quickly called this to the attention of the contractors. Blehm went straight to the observer and said, “We don’t fucking do that. I need to speak with the pod manager.” The table manager said that no one had ever told her that everyone had to be at the table when the one person who had made an error recounted to correct the error. This assumes that because the other two matched, the outlier was the mistake. The table manager reprimanded the participants when they returned, and said to the returning counters, “you are not marking anything.” This again assumes that the outlier was the mistake and was not proper quality control.
- The paper examination manager told station Paper Examination Station 7 personnel that the photo “doesn’t have to be precise.” This came after the worker stated that the camera was not capturing the entire image.

May 29, 2021

- Observers confirmed that organizers required them to wear pink or fuchsia shirts, and that they were being referred to as “pinkies” or “pinkos,” to either imply and/or assert that the observers were communists.
- Observers noticed that participants in Red Module 5 had scratch paper to tally the recounts. Observers asked about this and the table manager told the counters to place the papers inside the manila envelope. That same evening, another table was using the manila envelopes as the scratch paper to mark down the tallies. Observers documented multiple instances of scratch paper being used for recounts.
- Observers confirmed that participants were allowed to bring firearms into the Coliseum and on the counting floor “as long as they are concealed.”
- Observers saw that a box labeled “Hand Audit Batch 19 of 52” had been moved from the “Completed Cage” to the “In Process Cage.” Observers asked Bennett why this had been done, and he stated that once a box was in the “Completed

Cage,” it should not be removed. He did provide an explanation for how or why this box was moved.

- Observers saw at least three people who were not residents of Maricopa County rifling through thousands of military and overseas ballots. Observers had been previously told that only Maricopa County residents would be allowed to handle any ballots.

May 31, 2021.

- Observers noticed a software update on Paper Examination Station 26. The observers overheard the paper examination personnel say that they were “the guinea pigs” for the new software and then discuss the new user interface. Paper Examination Stations 24, 25 and 26 were the only three to receive the update. The new software paused frequently. Initially, this was only experienced by Paper Examination Station 25, and the manager assumed that it was related to the computer, not the software. Shortly thereafter, Paper Examination Station 26 began experiencing the same issues. When the software paused, the paper examination computer would not capture one of the photos—it was only capturing the front or the back of the ballot, but not both. The new software required two photos from the Canon and one photo from the microscope camera before proceeding. In the instances that only one side of the ballot was being captured, the software would then connect one side of the ballot with one side from the next ballot (i.e., front of Ballot A with back of Ballot B). Observers learned that this new requirement was instituted because participants were missing photos. At the conclusion of the morning shift, one of the paper examination managers made the decision to not proceed using the new software. All stations would remain on the previous version.
- Cyber Ninjas implemented another software update on the paper examination "forensics" workstations. The software update created so many errors and problems during the first shift that they stated they were going to roll back to the old software during the afternoon shift.

June 1, 2021

- Observers noted inconsistencies in the application of the recount process that could lead to incorrect counts: for example, when table managers tell counters that they are “correct” without evidence. Observers noted that two participants at the Red Module 8 Counting Station were told their tallies were “right” and that the third person was wrong, so they needed to recount. Due to this fact, the table manager informed the two counters whose tallies matched that they did not need to review their choices, and that the recount was for the counter who was incorrect. After recounting the five ballots in question, the counter did not have any changes and reviewed the counter’s sheet, stating that he was in fact correct and needed to check the other two. The table manager then checked the other two and one of the individuals had made an error adding the subtotals together

and matched the person who had been accused of being incorrect, meaning that the other person was the outlier.

- Observers attended the first night that included a third shift of ballot review. Observers noted there were only employees at four of the ballot counting tables and five of the paper examination tables. Observers also noted that two employees at different paper examination tables said that they needed someone to show them what to do. Observers heard the following from the two employees:
  - "I don't know anything, so if you want me to do anything you'll have to show me."
  - "I have never done this. Can someone show me how to take a photo, where do I click [on the computer]?"
- Observers heard a table manager overseeing the paper evaluation station tell another employee that there would be a post-analysis process that would find any anomalies that they missed. Employees asked if it was Jovan's [Pulitzer] software and the table manager said, "possibly."

June 2, 2021

- Observers noticed a crowd gathering around the master aggregation computer due to a massive tallying error. Observers overheard one of the people in the crowd say that "it [would] take the rest of the audit" to correct. After noticing that the observers were documenting the situation, the group moved to an area on the floor where observers were prohibited. The following day, observers noted that the master aggregation computer had a new database. Observers were not able to glean a complete explanation for the errors to which the contractors had been referring, but were told that when tallies matched in two out of three reports, the matching numbers would be kept and the third number would be discarded.
- Observers were informed that Cyber Ninjas employees planned to patch damaged boxes by taping a manila folder in the area where the boxes were tearing apart. According to Blehm, this was the state in which they received the ballot boxes, and that Cyber Ninjas have video evidence of that.
- Bennett removed ballots from the "Senate Cage," which was the ballot storage cage that only Ken Bennett and Pullen were supposed to access.
- Observers noted that employees were attempting to determine if a ballot was marked by a "Human" (green button) or not "Human" (red button). A paper examination manager noticed that all ballots at one table were being incorrectly identified by the red button as having non-human marks. The employees working the paper examination station were unaware that they were supposed to change the button within the software. The paper examination manager fixed it in the software, although a few dozen ballots remained mislabeled.
- The contractors told participants at Paper Examination Station 26 that "we're going to pilot something new on your station." A new low-resolution camera was added "just to see color" and the Cyber Ninjas employee told the paper examination station personnel, "don't pay attention to it." Approximately two and a half hours after piloting this new low-resolution camera, it was attached to each of the paper examination stations.

- Within a ten-minute timeframe, observers witnessed Paper Examination Stations 24 and 25 inadvertently turn off the undermount light on the microscope cameras. The light was used to capture the calibration mark on the backs of ballots. Without the light, only the front calibration mark was visible, preventing the alignment from front-to-back from being photographed. This was an ongoing issue that the observers noticed, because the on/off switch was built into the platform that the ballots sat upon. When the paper examination personnel ran their hand across it, the light shut off.
- Observers noted that all 28 paper examination tables were using the new software –after having to roll back to the old software due to the previous errors.
- Observers noted that these microscopes were giving off very high radio frequencies when security team members scanned them, apparently suspecting a transmission occurred at one of the stations near Paper Evaluation Stations 15-18.

June 3, 2021

- Logan permitted an observer to use a monocular while on the floor. When the monocular was used for the first time, an employee notified Blehm, who began shouting at the observer and directed security to remove the observer. Logan, who previously assured observers that the staff had been notified that the device was permitted, came to the floor, inspected the monocular to verify that it was not a camera, and again authorized its use. Approximately an hour after this incident, Blehm informed observers that the monocular was "scaring people" and a security person again inspected it to verify that it was not a camera.
- Observers reported that the master aggregation computer contained a new Access database. Observers tried learning about the information, but all that they could observe was the following queries:
  - Workstation/folder aggregation
  - Count Summaries folders by day
  - Summary President
  - Summary Senate
- Observers reported that large spreadsheets appeared to be used to aggregate the individual tally sheets, using a system that was run in the Command Prompt called aggrivator.exe, as observed. This indicates there were two separate databases, one that contained aggregated data, and the Access database. Based on this finding, observers believed that the aggregated spreadsheets were used to maintain updated results on an ongoing basis.
- At approximately 6:30 p.m., software taking photos of the ballots got out of sync, producing distorted images. A manager had to correct this issue, but it occurred again at approximately 6:45 p.m. This was the same issue that had necessitated the prior software rollback. This issue occurred daily.

June 4, 2021

- Observers noticed that employees were not following the published policies on suspicious ballot handling. This was a recurring issue. The policy states that

ballots will be separated from their batch and put in a specific folder for separate review. Instead, employees kept them in their original boxes. Ballots that had been flagged for additional review were being mixed in with other ballots.

- Observers noted the yellow pod and tables were removed to put in more paper examination stations. As of June 10, 2021, the new paper examination tables had not been set up or put into use. A Cyber Ninjas employee was excited that the cameras arrived on June 10, 2021, and told an observer, "now all we need is computers."

June 7, 2021

- Observers noted that participants were counting both original and duplicate ballots, and including each in the overall tally.
- Observers saw that boxes containing personal identifiable information were being moved from the more secure Senate Cage to a less secure cage that more people had access to.
- Only table managers (wearing black t-shirts) or runners (wearing purple t-shirts) were permitted to retrieve a ballot box for inspection. Observers noted that workers in any color t-shirt, working in any role on the floor, were both returning and bringing boxes of ballots for inspection. There were no authorization checks before ballots were moved around.
- Bennett allowed Cyber Ninjas to remove multiple ballot boxes from the "Senate Cage," a ballot storage area that only he and Randy Pullen could access. Blehm told the observers that Bennett was leaving for the night, and the ballots were removed from the more secure "Senate Cage" so that inspections could continue without him.

June 8, 2021

- Contractors moved the majority of the boxes in the Senate Cage to the less secure cage and the boxes were missing chain-of-custody forms. were also removed and placed in the cage with all other boxes of ballots.
- Observers reported frequent camera software crashes and that the paper examination manager needed to reconfigure the software often so that the images would show up on the computer monitor or the camera. The software was rebooted multiple times.
- Observers saw contractors printing instructions entitled "Phase 1 Retrospective Quality Control." This was more than three weeks after the initiation of Phase 2, and more than a month after the observers were told that the quality control stations and computers had been set up on May 7, 2021.
- Observers noted brand new Paper Examination procedures, presumably that coincided with the new software. Observers reported that the new procedures included an updated "What to Flag" section with only two items: 1) Feels Lighter/Heavier or Textured Differently than Ballot Paper and 2) Any Anomaly that Cannot be Captured by the Camera or Microscope.
- Observers saw a contractor approach a colleague on June 9, 2021, with a large stack of tally sheets from the "Phase 1 Retrospective Quality Control" process,

stating, "I got bad news for you, I need your purple pen." The purple pen was used for correcting errors or signing off on errors that cannot be corrected.

- Observers noted a document called "Retrospective Phase 1 Quality Control," containing procedures on how employees would perform quality checks on the tally data entered into the spreadsheets during "Phase 1," from the first day of the review through May 14, 2021, when the review was stopped because the Coliseum was reserved for high school graduation ceremonies. Observers were told that the procedures, although being implemented, were still in draft form, so the contractors would not share the contents.

June 9, 2021

- Observers saw that the "draft" procedures were being used to input data into a spreadsheet. Observers noted that the procedures being followed were not standard quality control procedures. Employees were re-entering the data from the tally sheets that employees had used during the initial review. The new spreadsheet was set up to flag any mismatched numbers. Instead of validating the original data, mismatched numbers were altered to match. This alarmed observers because tally sheets are marked using red or green pens. Access to both red and green pens and to tally sheets was readily available, creating opportunities for tally sheets to be altered after the initial review. This made the "Retrospective Phase 1 Quality Control" process unreliable.
- Blehm told an observer, "you should clean up the way the county does business. We are finding a bunch of ways they screw up elections, so you should address those." This was notable to the observer because this was within the scope of the contract that Cyber Ninjas had with the Senate.
- Observers reported another new process was implemented surrounding the original and duplicated ballots. The observers noticed two teams of data entry personnel members sitting at a paper examination station with military and overseas ballots and damaged ballots. The observers noticed that the ballots were not being photographed. Rather, the data entry personnel members were entering information into a spreadsheet. Cyber Ninjas explained that this new process entailed documenting the indicia number, the vote for President, and the perceived rationale for why the ballot needed to be duplicated

June 10, 2021

- Observers noted another process change when two data entry participants were discussing the information being tracked. One participant listed, serial number, vote for President, reason for needing duplication and the other data entry person responded, "No, that changed later in the evening."
- Contractors informed observers the process for tallying original and duplicated ballots had been modified. The new procedure was to count, tally, and aggregate the results of the original ballots instead of the duplicates.

June 12, 2021

- Observers asked Bennett for a demonstration of the aggregation procedures, and he replied, "I have been asking for the same thing."
- Observers saw that Blue Module 4 and Blue Module 8 turned in all of the documentation without "Do Not Aggregate" written on the pages. The runner happened to catch both of these instances and told the table manager to write this phrase on the chain of custody sheet only; the tally sheets did not have this phrase written on them. Observers identified this as an ongoing issue. When they asked a table manager to explain the procedures, he said that the procedure was to make this notation only on the chain-of-custody sheet and not the tally sheets. Observers noted that this was incorrect, that contractors confirmed that both the tally and chain of custody sheets needed the designation on them. Furthermore, it would not make sense to not have "Do Not Aggregate" on the tally sheets, as that was the data that would be entered into aggregation.
- Observers overheard a discussion regarding a box that contained a mixture of provisional and duplicated ballots. Participants were given the following instructions: "We will not aggregate the duplicates, but we will handle the other provisionals as regular ballots." Since the provisionals would be handled as regular ballots, observers assumed this meant they would be counted, tallied, and aggregated. Contractors later told observers that the provisional ballots would be withheld from the regular aggregation and would be entered into a separate spreadsheet for provisional ballots only. There was no indication as to when or if the provisional ballot totals would be included in the aggregation.

June 14, 2021

- Observers noted a new process being referred to as "quality control." This process had three phases: QCC, QCT, and QCTR. Observers believed that these initials stand for Quality Control Count, Quality Control Tally, and Quality Control Tally Retrospective. On June 19, 2021, Cyber Ninjas' attorney Bryan Blehm confirmed that QCT stands for Quality Control Tally.
- Observers additionally noted that:
  - The QCC, or Quality Control Count, process appears to be an attempt to count the number of ballots in a given batch and in an entire box and compare it to the tally that Maricopa County recorded on the batch sheet.
  - The QCT, or Quality Control Tally, process required participants to spin the ballots on the carousel again in order to get a new tally of the entire box of ballots.
  - The QCTR, or Quality Control Tally Retrospective, process was added on June 19, 2021. Observers were unable to ascertain what the process entailed.

Overall, there was no information available about how tally differences would be reconciled or recorded, or which of the tallies would be considered correct. This provided another opportunity for the results of the tally to potentially be altered.

June 17, 2021

- Observers saw multiple boxes of “Ankylin WiFi Microscope” portable cameras with 1000x magnification, at 1080P resolution, and with photo/video capability. The observers verified that the model of microscope, in addition to having WiFi capable cameras, have an iOS and Android app the cameras can stream to. This means that the images could have been sent or intercepted by unknown devices.
- Bennett opened the "Senate Cage" to allow Cyber Ninjas to remove ballots from the "Senate Cage" and move the ballots to the other cages that people in any color t-shirt could access.
- Observers saw that Cyber Ninjas employees continued to use insecure cybersecurity practices. For example, a paper examination table manager gave a StratTech employee a list of shared passwords to log into the system as he was attempting to correct an issue with the software being used at Paper Examination Table 13. After the StratTech completed his work at the station, he put the paper with the passwords into his pocket and walked away.
- Observers saw many of the paper examination stations experiencing significant delays because the software that was being used was "paus[ing]" regularly.
- Paper Examination Table 13 was having so much trouble with the software that participants asked StratTech employees to fix the issue because participants were receiving an error message. The StratTech employees dismissed the message but were not able to correct the "pause" that continued to occur. Another StratTech employee rebooted the software four times without success, then rebooted the entire system. None of these attempts corrected the issue.

June 18, 2021

- Observers witnessed participants at a quality control tally table count 24 ballots. This conflicted with another count, which showed 25 ballots. In a credible audit, the batch would have been recounted. Instead, the table manager said she thought she found the 25th ballot stuck to another ballot and proceeded without recounting the batch.

June 19, 2021

- Observers saw Blehm drop data on the floor from a "Spoiled" ballot envelope, which was labeled "Reprinted–Jam–See Other Side." Blehm and Bennett continued to process several batches during the seven minutes that it took Bryan Blehm to notice the data on the floor. Observers were not able to confirm that the dropped data/ballot was returned to the correct envelope. Approximately, three minutes later, the observers brought it to the attention of Blehm and Bennett, who both said that the data was placed in the correct bag. Observers inquired further, because the data/ballot was dropped approximately 10 minutes earlier. Observers did not receive an answer.

- Observers watched Bennett get the remaining boxes of "Spoiled" ballots from the more secure Senate Cage, which contains sensitive information. The observers noticed that when Ken Bennett unlocked the cage, he set the lock on the floor outside the cage without resetting the access code. Observers noted the code on the lock, as it was clearly visible. When Ken Bennett turned the combination pad after replacing it on the cage and reconnecting it, observers were able to confirm that the code they saw was the correct access code. This is especially alarming because this was the area where the most sensitive information, including personal identifiable information, was stored.
- Observers noticed the contractors documenting information about the "Spoiled" ballots. In the initial batch, observers noted that an envelope entitled "Arrowhead Towne Center" contained an absentee affidavit envelope with personal identifiable information on it. The table manager took it and placed it in a plastic sandwich bag and set it on the table, alongside the personnel members reviewing the ballots. When Blehm walked by, the table manager handed him the sandwich bag with the envelope; he folded it in half in his hand and walked around as he waited for Co-chair Randy Pullen to open the Senate Cage, which was where they were storing boxes of data with personal identifiable information. Pullen opened the Senate Cage and Blehm set the sandwich bag in a box entitled "Arizona Veterans Memorial Coliseum." While this may have been the correct box, the envelope was not placed in the correct batch within the box, so it was not associated with the "Arrowhead Towne Center."
- Observers witnessed Bennett defacing Maricopa County's original labels on the ballot boxes and the envelopes contained within. Bennett wrote directly on the ballot boxes and Cyber Ninjas covered the original label up with a piece of tape and wrote the same information on the tape, trying to cover up what he had written.

June 21, 2021

- Observers noted another new process called "QC-IFS", in which the workers were retrieving SD cards (removable media) from hundreds of ballot boxes that were placed there when the boxes were first imaged in the paper examination process. The SD cards were taken to workstations and the data from the cards was copied to the audit servers, presumably to replace data that had been lost or was missing from the servers, as this data should already have been on the servers from the initial imaging process. The cards were then replaced back into their original boxes.

June 22, 2021

- Observers again noted a new process called "QC-PE", which, unlike its name suggests, was not a quality control process but an entire re-imaging of at least 80 boxes of previously imaged ballots. SD cards of the images that were previously placed in the boxes during the first imaging process were all placed in a common bin and replaced with new cards created by the re-imaging process. There was no chain of custody process in place for the old cards.

- Observers identified a process called “QC-IFS,” which appeared to be an effort to correct incorrect or missing data.
- Observers noted boxes missing chain of custody forms, and some of the boxes contained personally identifiable information

June 23, 2021

- Observers noted another new process called "QC-PE," which entailed re-imaging previously imaged ballots at the paper examination stations, and 81 ballots were in queue boxes for this process. These boxes appeared to contain Election Day ballots that were completed during Phase 1 prior to the graduations. In late April or early May the ballots went through the paper examination process.

June 24, 2021

- Observers saw participants handling food and ballots at the same time.

June 25, 2021

- Observers noted that activity continued to appear chaotic. Participants handling boxes were confused about where they and the boxes needed to go and where they were in the process. The participants attempted to color-code boxes with pieces of tape with corresponding color-coded signs in the cages. However, the integrity of the sorting system was not well maintained. For example, an observer saw a box with a label that read, "Counted, Examined, Complete," and another label on the side (of the same color tape) that only read "Counted."
- Each box of ballots was supposed to have one SD card with the paper examination data on it. Observers saw a box with two SD cards taped inside of it, and that box was sent to the paper examination station three times. Some of the quality control procedures appeared to create new errors, requiring additional changes to the overall process.

June 26, 2021

- Observers noted an additional step in the quality control process called “Rebatch QC” which, despite the name, was not a quality control process, but instead was a separate recount of ballots that had been reviewed earlier.
- Aggregation tables were at capacity and participants were keeping two separate spreadsheets for the “Rebatch QC” tally and the “Retro PC” tally, creating fragmented data sets that could be easily manipulated.

- Observers saw participants using software intended to distinguish non-ballot images from ballot images, but the software was so flawed that it consistently misidentified the images, and the files had to be manually reviewed.

June 28, 2021

- The contractors and CyFir founder Ben Cotton told observers that Cyber Ninjas were moving the remaining voting machine equipment to a cage on the counting floor in order to reduce the need for security in both places.
- Observers saw Bennett, Cotton, and other participants drop a storage rack full of precinct tabulators while trying to move it over a two-inch ramp.
- Observers noted that multiple tamper-evident seals broke, and some fell off as participants were cleaning the tabulators from the floor. Cotton then told observers that he did not believe that the equipment had been damaged, although he had not tested the equipment.
- Observers also saw Cotton photographing one piece of equipment that had a broken or scratched screen. Observers saw several other pieces of damaged equipment.
- The observers saw multiple people working on a spreadsheet entitled “Aggregation Batch Issues,” with tabs named “Batches only found in Agg” and “Batches not found in Agg” (aggregation). It appears that they could not find portions of their data.

June 29, 2021

- Observers identified a new addition to the quality control process entitled “Purple Sheet QC.” A participant at the purple-sheet quality control station said that she could not “find a batch in either system.” The observers noted more confusion.
- Observers noted multiple people working on similar projects. Although they were working on the same project, some participants worked directly in the spreadsheets while others on hardcopies or on sticky notes. Observers overheard a participant say they will have issues with consistency because the “master sheet” was being updated but the paper copies were not.

July 1, 2021

- Observers reported that the contractors moved equipment and ballots from the Coliseum to a smaller building on the fairgrounds property.

July 6, 2021

- Observers noted that new counting machines, reportedly purchased by the Senate, had been set up in the new building.

July 7, 2021

- Observers reported that they were no longer allowed floor access to the process, and could not see most of the work being performed.
- Observers noted that the temperature in the room was 88 degrees Fahrenheit.

July 8, 2021

- Observers were again granted floor access.

July 12, 2021

- Observers saw staff changing the physical file system for tally sheets. Previously, the tally sheets were stored by unit/pod. They were now being reorganized by pallet/box. Data in the spreadsheets was also being updated to match the physical sheets.
- Observers reported that the data updates seemed to be creating consistency issues, and noted several sheets protruding from boxes that had the word “Guess?” written on them.
- The temperature in the building was over 89 degrees Fahrenheit.

July 16, 2021

- Observers reported that the Senate contractors were referring to this new counting process as “Phase 3—QC.”
- This counting process was occurring at the same time as Logan testified in a Senate hearing that all Cyber Ninjas had left to do was “some more aggregation.”

July 17, 2021

- Observers noted that the temperature in the building was 84 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity was 62%.

July 19, 2021

- Observers noted that the temperature in the building was 90 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity was 56%.

July 20, 2021

- Observers noted that the temperature in the building was 88 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity was 61%.

July 21, 2021

- Observers noted that the temperature in the building was 90 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity was 59%.

July 22, 2021

- Observers noted that the temperature in the building was 91 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity was 53%.

July 23, 2021

- Observers reported water leaking from the roof in five places, including in the ballot storage areas.
- Workers covered the ballot pallets with a plastic sheet.
- Observers noted that the temperature in the building was 77 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity was 81%.

July 24, 2021

- Observers noted that the temperature in the building was 77 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity was 84%.
- Observers reported that the original Maricopa County labels on three ballot boxes on pallet 42 were damaged or torn.

July 26, 2021

- Observers noted that the temperature in the building was 84 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity was 63%.
- Observers heard Logan say that he "[did] not know" if the data from the Senate ballot count would be used in the final Cyber Ninjas report.

July 27, 2021

- Observers reported that chain of custody forms were not attached to ballot boxes while being handled by multiple workers.
- Observers noted that some chain of custody forms were altered after work had been completed on the relevant boxes.
- Observers noted that the temperature in the building was 88 degrees Fahrenheit and humidity was 56%.

July 29, 2021

- Observers reported that ballots and voting equipment were returned to Maricopa County Officials.